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Abstract
Credit card payments and revolving debt are important for consumer theory but a key data
source—credit bureau records—does not distinguish between current charges and revolving
debt from the previous month. We develop a theory-based econometric methodology informed
by survey evidence to estimate the likelihood a consumer is revolving each quarter. We validate
our approach using a new survey linked to credit bureau data. For likely revolvers: (1) 100
percent of an increase in credit becomes an increase in debt eventually; (2) credit limit changes
are half as salient as debt changes; and (3) revolving status is extremely persistent.
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1 Introduction
Understanding credit card use is an important part of modern consumer theory. The literature has
focused on the use of credit cards to provide liquidity to buffer income and expenditures shocks,
and it is easy to see why. Figure 1 shows that debt on revolving accounts rose from 0 to 9 percent
of disposable personal income over three decades, then dropped by almost one-third after the
Financial Crisis. What this accumulation of debt and the accompanying changes in credit tell us
have been central to the literature (Gross and Souleles, 2002; Agarwal et al., 2017; Gross et al.,
2020; Chava et al., 2019; Aydin, 2015; Fulford and Schuh, 2017). Understanding why and when
consumers revolve credit card debt from month-to-month is a central focus of several puzzles in
consumer finance (Bertaut et al., 2009; Laibson et al., 2003; Agarwal et al., 2009). Yet roughly
half of people with credit cards use them solely for the “convenience" of making payments, taking
advantage of interest-free short-term debt by re-paying their bill in full every month.1 Failing to
account for the difference between convenience and revolving uses can give a misleading picture
of consumer financial management (Johnson, 2007; Zinman, 2009b), money demand (Schuh and
Briglevics, 2014; King, 2004; Akhand and Milbourne, 1986), and payment choice (Zinman, 2009a;
King and King, 2005).
Credit bureau data have become one of the most important sources of information on consumer
credit available to researchers at policy and academic institutions. Credit bureau data collected
from financial institutions give a comprehensive view over time of an individual consumer’s credit
cards and other debts, such as mortgages or auto loans, so they are a key source of nationally
representative statistics on credit use at the individual and aggregate level. However, financial in-
stitutions (furnishers) report the total credit card debt owed by a consumer at the time of reporting,
which is the sum of current-period credit card charges plus unpaid debt revolved from the previous
period (if any). Thus, credit bureau data do not directly identify convenience debt (current charges)
1See statistics in reports from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and Survey of Consumer Payment Choice
(SCPC). "Convenience users" are also sometimes called "transactors." One reason for convenience use is the discount
earned from rewards, which steers consumers toward credit cards (Ching and Hayashi, 2010). This credit card fee-
reward system generates regressive transfers among consumers (Schuh et al., 2010).
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and revolving debt separately, a point made recently by Agarwal et al. (2018), among others.2
To overcome this shortcoming, we develop a theory-based econometric methodology informed
by survey evidence that derives an estimate of the likelihood a given consumer in credit bureau data
is revolving or not. The approach is broadly applicable to help policy and research organizations
with access to credit bureau data better understand a key facet of consumer credit use. We then
use our estimates to study whether convenience users and revolvers react differently to changes in
credit limits, a central question in the literature examining consumer credit use, and thus provide a
comparison of the relative empirical importance of credit limits and debt.
We estimate a finite mixture model based on intertemporal choice theory, which suggests that
debt dynamics of revolvers and convenience users should differ in important ways. Convenience
users do not revolve their current charges across periods, so the evolution of their debt mimics
that of all consumption, which in its simplest form would follow a martingale process. The debt
of revolvers, on the other hand, acts like a negative asset with significant persistence and a strong
impact of credit limits. We combine this theory observation with information on revolving by age
and credit utilization in the credit bureau data and surveys to estimate the finite mixture model.
Together, these pieces provide an estimate of the likelihood an individual is revolving based on his
or her credit and debt dynamics, age, and credit utilization. We examine different specifications of
dynamics for revolvers and conveniences users and choose the model that best predicts revolving
in the Making Ends Meet Survey linked to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (CFPB’s)
credit bureau data. Our approach provides better separation between credit card uses in the survey
data than a model using age and utilization alone.
2Other data sources do distinguish between revolvers and convenience users, but are limited in other ways. Highly
restricted bank account data provides information on whether an individual credit card account is revolving, but do not
provide information on the consumer as a whole (see, for example, Gross and Souleles (2002), Grodzicki and Koulayev
(2019), Agarwal et al. (2017, 2018), reports using the JPMorgan Chase Institute data such as Farrell and Greig (2017)).
Seeing only the cards an individual holds at a single institution is quite limiting: the Survey of Consumer Payment
Choice (SCPC) shows the average consumer holds more than three cards. More detailed information is available on
the select consumers willing to let a personal financial management apps collect transactions data across accounts.
(See, for examples, Gelman et al. (2014), Baker (2018), and Olafsson and Pagel (2018)). Publicly available survey
data like the SCPC and Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) contain self-reported revolving status, but do not have the
rich dynamics and frequency of account level data and have difficulty matching more comprehensive data (Zinman,
2009b).
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Using our estimates, we make three central empirical findings. First, for consumers who are
likely to be revolvers, 100 percent of an increase in credit limit becomes an increase in debt eventu-
ally. This large pass-through from credit to debt is similar across credit utilization levels and across
age, conditional on revolving. Convenience users are much less sensitive to changes in their credit
limits. When we estimate the impact of a change in credit on all consumers, we closely match es-
timates of exogenous changes to credit that do not distinguish between revolvers and convenience
users (Gross et al., 2020; Chava et al., 2019).
Our second finding is that changes in credit for revolvers have about half the impact of changes
in debt. In standard intertemporal accounting, a decrease in credit and an increase in debt have
identical impacts on liquidity (after accounting for interest payments). We show how this observa-
tion implies a relationship between the coefficients on past debt and credit limits. Yet many people
may not know or pay attention to their credit limit unless they are actually at the limit, or they
may view credit limits as a soft constraint which can be increased with a phone call. Credit limits
may thus be much less "salient” than debt in affecting intertemporal behavior. We find that for
revolvers, limits are between one third and one half as salient as debt on average. For convenience
users, changes in credit are only 6 percent as salient as debt.
Third, our estimates further suggest that revolving is very persistent. About 20 percent of
high probability revolvers transition to being low probability revolvers after four years. This find-
ing is consistent with the limited survey evidence and with Grodzicki and Koulayev (2019) who
show that revolving episodes on individual credit card lines are quite persistent as well. Our work
complements theirs by looking at the entire consumer, but having to infer revolving rather than
observing it directly.
Overall, our empirical findings suggest that revolvers and convenience users react quite dif-
ferently to changes in credit, so policies are likely to have very different effects for these two
populations. A large literature uses credit bureau or similar data to understand credit card use and
the impacts of various policies. There is often significant variation in estimated impacts over time
and for different populations. Some of this variation may be from combining different populations
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of credit card users over time or be from differences in the fraction of revolvers captured by the
local average treatment effect.3 Our results suggest that underlying the population average effect
of a change in credit are (at least) two populations with very different relationships to changes
in credit. In complementary work with an explicit dynamic structural model, Fulford and Schuh
(2017) show that at least two populations—one impatient and willing to revolve, one patient and
willing to save—are necessary for intertemporal consumption models to fit the course of credit
card debt over the life-cycle and the persistence of credit utilization.
A small literature examines the differences between credit card revolvers and convenience
users, generally using surveys to understand the correlates between revolving and convenience
use. King (2004) uses the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to examine the impact of credit
cards on money demand. Tan et al. (2011) examine the propensity to revolve using a survey in
Malaysia. King and King (2005) examine the tradeoff between debit and credit cards using the
SCF. Sprenger and Stavins (2010) examine credit card debt and payment choices. Zinman (2009a)
examines the decision to use a debit or credit card, the relative price of which depends on whether
someone is revolving because revolvers start paying interest immediately, while convenience users
benefit from a grace period.
Perhaps the clearest, more basic policy implication of our work is the benefit of expanding and
refining credit bureau data and similar data sources to directly measure and distinguish between
revolving and convenience use so researchers do not need to rely on econometric inference. Efforts
such as the Making Ends Meet Survey used here or Stavins (2020) who merges the SCPC with
credit bureau data at the consumer level to examine how debt balances and the decision to use
debit cards differs for revolvers, are a step in this direction.
3See, for example, Chava et al. (2019) who used exogenous variation in credit limits to examine the pass-through
from credit to debt and finds relatively large pass-through, but also significant heterogeneity. Gross et al. (2020)
examine the increase in credit card limits and credit card debt following the aging off of a bankruptcy flag from credit
reports to understand the marginal propensity to consume over time. Brown et al. (2015) examine the substitution
patterns between home equity and credit cards and find it varies over time. Some of the heterogeneity examined by
Pence (2015) when discussing Brown et al. (2015) may be from the mix of revolving and convenience populations.
Similarly, Fulford and Stavins (2019) find significant variation in the impact of mortgage acquisition on credit card
borrowing, but cannot distinguish revolving debt from payment debt.
5
2 The data
Our data come from credit bureaus, which are national consumer reporting companies (NCRC) that
receive and maintain information about all kinds of credit activity from financial institutions for
nearly all consumers. Equifax, Experian, and Transunion are the three main U.S. credit bureaus.
In recent years, credit bureau data have been made available to researchers and policy makers in
anonymized form that protects the confidentiality of consumers.
Although they contain a rich array of information, credit bureau data represent only a subset
of the comprehensive records maintained by banks or other creditors about individual consumer
accounts. An NCRC is a data aggregator that relies on data “furnishers”—typically the creditor—
to collect and report information on the individual “tradelines” for each consumer. For credit
cards, the tradeline information typically includes the total amount owed (current charges plus
unpaid debt from last period, if any), the credit limit, whether the account is current, and whether
the account was current in the past. Furnishers typically provide updates to credit card tradelines
monthly and the updates may coincide with a consumer’s billing cycle. The NCRC combines the
tradelines reported from many furnishers with information it maintains at a consumer level.
For this paper, we used the CFPB’s Consumer Credit Panel (CCP). The CCP is an anonymized
1-in-48 sample of all credit bureau records from one of the three main U.S. credit bureaus. In
the CCP, we observe a panel of credit reports every quarter; our analysis uses quarterly data from
2012 to 2019. The large size of the data makes it computationally impractical to examine within-
person dynamics on the entire CCP, so we conduct our analysis on a 5 percent sub-sample of
the CCP. Our analysis data set restricts to consumers with an open card at some point during the
sample period and contains approximately 250,000 consumers per quarter and nearly 12.8 million
consumer-quarter observations. Of these, only 9.3 million consumer-quarter observations have an
open credit card because consumers gain and lose credit cards frequently (Fulford, 2015a). We
combine all credit card tradelines together to form a consumer-level panel that gives a the total
credit card debt of each consumer over time.
Not all credit bureau data used by research or policy institutions contain the same level of
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tradeline detail or frequency of reporting. Our approach is practical for credit bureau data that
are at least quarterly and contain either all credit card tradelines separately or the sum of credit
card tradelines at the consumer level. We calculated many of the results presented here in an
earlier working paper (Fulford and Schuh, 2015) with similar credit bureau data (the Equifax/NY
Fed Consumer Credit Panel available through the Federal Reserve System) and found only minor
differences between results.
While the CCP and other credit bureau data give a complete picture of consumers’ debts,
credit bureau data do distinguish revolvers from convenience users directly. We use two surveys
extensively that ask about revolving to gain more insight into how people are using and acquiring
the debt we see in the CCP. We also compare some results to the Survey of Consumer Finances.
The CFPB’s Making Ends Meet survey (MEM) is a survey of financial decision-making. The
sampling frame for the survey is the CCP. This link allows us to compare the administrative credit
bureau data to self-reported revolving status to validate our methodology. The survey was in the
field in May and June 2019 and has 2990 respondents. The survey is weighted to be representative
of consumers with a credit record, which, by definition, includes all consumers with a credit card.
Initial results from the the survey and weighting are described in Fulford and Rush (2020).
The Survey of Consumer Payment Choice (SCPC) conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta examines how a nationally representative sample of consumers decides which payments
instruments to use and how these consumers use them. The survey was part of the RAND American
Life Panel from 2008-2014 and has been implemented using the Understanding America Study
Panel since then. Recent waves of the survey have included slightly over 3,000 respondents (Foster
et al., 2019).
3 Credit card use
There are three facets to credit card use: (1) whether someone has a credit card and thus “adopted”
it as payment instrument; (2) whether someone uses that card to pay for expenditures; (3) whether
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someone pays off the debt incurred when the card is used for payment at the end of the billing cycle
or “revolves” debt from month to month. People who use their cards only for payments are often
called convenience users or transactors, because they are using the card as a convenient payment
mechanism for transactions. Because the difference in use is central to our empirical examination,
we briefly examine each of these elements of card use in turn.
Adoption of credit cards has been relatively stable the last 30 years. The share of consumers
with a credit card has been approximately constant at around 70 percent since 1989 (Schuh and
Stavins, 2015, p. 20). Information on how frequently credit cards are used is more recent. Pooling
the SCPC from 2012 to 2017, 69.9 percent of respondents report having a credit card. Conditional
on having a credit card, 83 percent of credit card adopters (58 percent of all consumers) use it
for a transaction in the previous month. These respondents use it for 25.2 percent of transactions.
Figure 2 shows the credit card adoption rate, overall population use rate, and share of transactions
(conditional on adoption) over the life-cycle. Credit card adoption is increasing steadily over the
life-cycle from around 40 percent in the early 20s to above 90 percent for those over 75. At any
given age, the gap between adoption and payment use in the past month is about 10 percentage
points.4 Note that some of the people who did not use their card for a payment may nonetheless
have some revolving debt on the card from previous transactions. Conditional on having a card, the
share of all transactions using a credit card is fairly stable over the life cycle at around 25 percent.
What fraction of users in Figure 2 are revolving debt from month to month? In the CCP, a
large fraction of consumers with an open credit card have positive debt at any given point in time.
This large fraction is slightly misleading, however, because credit bureau data does not allow us to
distinguish new charges from debt acquired previously. Some credit card users users pay off their
entire balance every month. Others may roll debt over from one month to the next and so are using
the revolving credit aspect of credit cards. Both have unpaid debt at any given point in time, so
they are indistinguishable in the data.
Figure 3 shows the fraction in different age groups who reported that they revolve credit card
4We obtain a similar figure using the CCP to show the fraction of all accounts with an open credit card and with
positive credit card debt by age.
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debt from month to month (conditional of having a card) using the pooled 2012-2017 Survey of
Consumer Payment Choice and the 2019 MEM. The point estimates of the surveys are generally
close, and the confidence intervals generally include the other survey, so we discuss them jointly.
Between the ages of 20-25 and 40-50, the fraction revolving debt increases from around 40 percent
to around 60 percent. The fraction revolving proceeds to fall steadily, but even at age 70-75, around
40 percent of the credit card holding population reports revolving debt. Around 80 percent of the
70-75 year old population has a credit card (Figure 2), so a large portion of the population is
borrowing at high interest rates even well into retirement age.
Figure 4 shows the fraction who report revolving in the MEM surveyby their credit card uti-
lization rate (total debt/total credit card limit) in the CCP. The overall contours of revolving and
utilization are clear from the figure: (1) most people using less than 10 percent of their credit limit
are not revolving, (2) about 60 percent of people using between 10 and 30 percent of their credit
report revolving; (3) around 80 percent of people with utilization greater than 30 percent report
revolving. The survey evidence is similar to the fraction of credit card accounts that are revolving
by utilization reported in Grodzicki and Koulayev (2019). Note that credit card accounts studied
by Grodzicki and Koulayev (2019) are different from consumers because a consumer may have
many cards.
In Figure 4, slightly less than 20 percent report revolving on a credit card despite having almost
no credit card debt in the quarter of the survey (the 0-1 percent utilization group is predominantly 0
utilization). One reason may be the timing of the survey compared to the last credit card statement.
When people answer the survey and the quarterly reporting of the CCP do not coincide exactly, so
some people may have credit card debt at the time of the survey, but not as of the last reporting for
the quarterly CCP. It is also possible that some people misunderstood the question.
We next examine the distribution of credit limits, debt, and utilization. The top two panels of
Figure 5 show the distribution of credit card limits and credit card debt (both conditional on being
positive) over age. The figures are on a log scale so changes in them are proportional to changes in
credit utilization (conditional only on the limit being positive) in the bottom panel. Early in the life
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cycle, median credit card debt increases with credit limits and continues to increase until the age
of 50. After age 60, credit card debt starts falling. The median 70- and 80-year-old has as much
credit card debt as the median 20-30 year-old. Of course, some of that debt is convenience use, but
it illustrates the extent to which credit is an integral part of the financial life of people across all
ages, as well as the importance of credit limits.
Credit limits and debt combine to give the fraction of credit used, shown in the bottom panel
of Figure 5. Consumers with zero debt have zero credit utilization, and so are included in utiliza-
tion but are excluded from debt distribution, which includes only positive values. Median credit
utilization falls continuously from age 20 to age 80. The median 20-year-old is using more than 30
percent of available credit, and median 50-year-old is still using nearly 30 percent of their credit.
Credit utilization falls to below 20 percent only around age 70.5
Figure 6 shows a histogram of the credit utilization distribution over all ages that gives more de-
tail than the quantiles. Around one quarter of the population is using below 10 percent of available
credit. Above 10 percent, the distribution is then relatively flat between approximately 20 percent
utilization and 80 percent utilization, with a hump just before 100 percent utilization. However, rel-
atively speaking, a large portion of the population is not actively hitting its credit limit at any given
time. Not being at a credit limit does not mean that credit limits do not matter, but does suggest
that an important part of understanding how credit limits might matter is through the intertemporal
budget constraint (Fulford and Schuh, 2017).
A useful way to read the histogram in Figure 6 is that there are, broadly speaking, two popu-
lations mixed together: a population that uses almost none of its credit, and a population that uses
anywhere from 20 to 100 percent of its available credit about evenly. As we show in Figure 4,
about 80 percent of people with 30 percent or higher utilization are revolving.
5These medians are somewhat lower than we reported in an earlier working paper (Fulford and Schuh, 2015) using
the NY Fed/Equifax consumer credit panel. The NY Fed/Equifax CCP is also derived from a large sample of credit
bureau data. It does not separately identify individual credit card trade lines. One reason may be that the definition
of which accounts are general purpose credit cards may differ between the two data sets. The dynamics of credit card
utilization and debt are nearly identical to Fulford and Schuh (2015).
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4 Debt dynamics
This section applies insights from intertemporal consumption theory to derive some implications
for how the debt of convenience users and revolvers should evolve. The basic idea is that conve-
nience users are using their cards only for payments, so the credit bureau debt we observe should
evolve in ways similar to consumption. We model convenience users as consumers with sufficient
assets that they can smooth consumption effectively. Debt for revolvers, on the other hand, is a
negative asset, so should evolve similarly to an asset. Because revolvers are borrowing, credit lim-
its may occasionally bind for them, so we model them as buffer-stock consumers who care about
available liquidity. Our goal throughout is to develop what existing theory suggests rather than
extend the theory. We use these distinct dynamics in the next section to help separate revolvers
from convenience users.
4.1 Debt for different kinds of users
Many of those with credit card debt in our data set are actually convenience users who are using
credit as a convenient payment mechanism but plan to pay off their entire debt before being charged
interest. Using the SCPC, Figure 3 shows that such convenience users are around 40 percent of
the credit card-using population early in the life cycle, and that the proportion rises with age. By
definition, convenience users charge some fraction ωi,t of their consumption Ci,t to their credit card
each month:
Di,t = ωi,tCi,t, (1)
where Di,t is credit card debt and ωi,t may be stochastic and time varying.
For a revolver, debt changes from period to period according to the standard accounting accu-
mulation equation:
Di,t+1 = (1 + r)(Di,t − Yi,t + Ci,t), (2)
where Yi,t is income, r is the interest rate, and t is either age or time, two concepts that are indistin-
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guishable for an individual. A revolver pays off debt if her income is greater than her consumption,
and she accumulates debt if her consumption exceeds her income.
Equations (1) and (2) are accounting equations for different kinds of uses. They do not make
assumptions about intertemporal behavior beyond assuming a known constant interest rate and
that, for a borrower, the amount of debt represents the amount of wealth.6 Even without putting
additional structure on the evolution of income and consumption, the accumulation equation sug-
gests that past debt impacts future debt for revolvers. The rest of this section takes these basic
equations and puts more structure on preferences and income to derive estimating equations.
4.2 Debt for convenience users
Suppose sufficiently wealthy consumers who do not revolve on credit cards can perfectly smooth
consumption up to shocks in the desire to spend (such as whether a consumer takes a vacation or
buys a durable good in a given month). Then convenience use in equation (1) should vary only
because of these expenditure shocks and the fraction of expenditures consumers charge on a card.
Then a sensible equation describing convenience debt is :
Di,t = η
C
i + f(agei,t) + εi,t (3)
where ηCi is a fixed effect capturing consumer i’s level of consumption and tendency to pay for
consumption with a credit card. The polynomial in age f(·) allows consumption, or the tendency
to use a card, to vary with age.
Alternatively, if the Permanent Income Hypotheses (PIH) holds for convenience users, then
following a change in income, consumption should adjust to the annuity value of the change in
income. See Hall (1978) for the original formulation, Deaton (1992) for an extended discussion of
the preferences and environment necessary for consumption to follow a martingale, and Blundell
6For the complicated consequences of relaxing this assumption, see Fulford (2015a).
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et al. (2008) for a more recent version that incorporates the life cycle and uncertainty. Then:
∆Di,t+1 = η + f(agei,t) + εi,t. (4)
Because consumption behaves as a martingale with drift, so does convenience debt. Equation (4)
allows permanent shifts up or down of convenience debt, while equation (3) allows the individual
effect to capture permanent consumption and assumes all further shifts are transitory. By omitting
limits, we are implicitly assuming that convenience users are not credit constrained. Convenience
users are typically using only a small fraction of their available credit (see Figure 4).
4.3 Debt for credit revolvers
We model revolvers as buffer-stock consumers who may be constrained by their limit occasion-
ally. The existence of an occasionally binding credit limit induces concavity into the consumption
function (Carroll and Kimball, 2001). Following Aiyagari (1994), the available liquidity or cash-
at-hand, isWt = Yt+Bt−Dt, which is just the sum of current income Yt and the current credit limit
Bt minus previously accumulated debt Dt. Given the available resources, consumers must decide
how much to consume today and how much to consume tomorrow. The consumption function may
vary with age as expectations of future income change (Carroll, 2001), and so:
Ci,t = Ct(Wi,t) = Ct(Yi,t +Bi,t −Di,t). (5)
Notice that using cash-at-hand inherently treats credit limits as equivalent to liquid savings within
the consumption function. This assumption does not imply that credit limits are necessarily binding
this period for revolvers, but instead that revolvers take into account the fact that by consuming
more and increasing their debt, they are reducing their available cash-at-hand for the future.
In expectation, the assets of buffer-stock consumers will tend to return to an individual specific
focal cash-at-hand W ∗i where liquidity is neither increasing or decreasing.
7 Appendix A.1 shows
7Deaton (1991) introduces the focal point. See Jappelli et al. (2008), Fulford (2015b) for recent empirical exami-
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that taking an expansion of the consumption function around the individual focal point and solving
for debt in the accumulation equation yields:
Di,t+1 = µi + µt + g(agei,t) + αDi,t + βBi,t + εi,t, (6)
where α = (1 + r)(1−M), β = (1 + r)M, and M is the marginal propensity to consume out of
cash-at-hand at its steady state. A log-linear approximation of the consumption function around
the individual specific focal point gives:
di,t+1 = µi + µt + g(agei,t) + αdi,t + βbi,t + εi,t, (7)
where lower case indicates logs, α = (1 + r)(1−m), β = (1 + r)m/ν̄, and m = C ′(W ∗)/C(W ∗)
is the elasticity of consumption with respect to changes in cash-at-hand measured at the steady
state of cash-at-hand and ν̄ is average credit utilization.
This expansion provides several useful predictions about the relationship between debt and the
credit limit. While the model assumes that credit limits matter, it is possible the credit limit is
not an important constraint on consumer choices. The consumer may not find credit limits salient,
particularly if they are not binding today. Alternatively, the consumer may be able to raise the
limit easily, so it may not represent a true constraint. Similarly, the model does not allow for
alternative assets so when the consumer is borrowing she must not be saving. In reality, consumers
do keep a small amount of liquid assets (Gross and Souleles, 2002; Fulford, 2015a), and some have
substantial illiquid assets. If these assets are substitutes for consumer credit, the credit limit will
not matter as much. Then, a simple test for whether the credit limit matters for consumption and
debt is β > 0.
More generally, in this framework of available liquidity, an increase in debt has nearly the
same impact on liquidity as a decrease in the credit limit because both affect cash at hand. The
accumulation equation approximations predict that α + β = (1 + r). This prediction is useful
nations. Fulford (2015b) discusses the underlying preferences that might change the individual specific focal point.
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for understanding the economic content of the model and its empirical implications. While credit
limits may not matter, debt certainly does because it directly affects the intertemporal budget con-
straint whether or not credit limits ever bind. Put differently, while the consumer has to decide
whether to adjust behavior when the credit limit changes and may decide to ignore changes that
are not binding today, creditors can make ignoring debt extremely costly. While β > 0 implies
that credit constraints matter, if β = (1 + r − α), then changes in debt have the same impact as
changes in assets or income.
There are several reasons credit might be less salient than assets. Credit limits may not be
reported well by banks and creditors to consumers. Consumers may not always know or remember
their credit limits. And the volatility of credit limits may make them less valuable to consumers
than a savings or checking account with more stable value (Fulford, 2015a). If credit is less salient
than assets, a change in credit will have a smaller impact than a change in debt or income. We can
back out an estimate of salience by assuming that only a fraction σBit of credit in accumulation
equation (2) matters for consumption decisions. Then, α + β/σ = (1 + r) and given estimates of
α and β and an appropriate interest rate r, the salience of credit compared to assets is:
σ =
β
(1 + r − α)
(8)
from equation (6) and:
σ =
βν̄
(1 + r − α)
(9)
from equation (7) in logs where ν̄ is average credit utilization.
5 Separating convenience users from revolvers
In this section, we take the modeling insights from the previous section and use them to help divide
the CCP into revolvers and and convenience users. The estimates take in the evolution of revolving
over age (Figure 3) and utilization (Figure 4) and then add the prediction of who is revolving based
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on individual debt dynamics using the implications of the previous section. The basic idea is to use
the data to separate the population statistically into those who at a given period are more likely to
be convenience users and those who are more likely to be revolvers. We employ a Finite Mixture
of Regressions model (Faria and Soromenho, 2010), sometimes also called a latent class model,
depending on the discipline and application. McLachlan and Peel (2000) provide a more complete
treatment. We examine several different specifications of the dynamics for convenience users and
revolvers to understand which give the best predictions.
5.1 The EM algorithm
Because we cannot observe directly who in the credit bureau data is a convenience user, the ob-
served data represent a combination of revolvers and convenience users. Each observation is one
or the other, but we cannot observe this latent class. However, we can construct a model of the
separate paths of debt for convenience users with density:
fC(Di,t|Di,t−1, Xi,t; θC , σC),
and for revolvers with density:
fR(Di,t|Di,t−1, Xi,t; θR, σR),
where the density functions are conditional on past debt, other observables Xit and parameters to
be estimated. Then the joint density of the data is:
H(Di,t|Di,t−1, Xi,t; Θ) = pCfC(Di,t|Di,t−1, Xi,t; θC , σC) + (1− pC)fR(Di,t|Di,t−1, Xi,t; θR, σR),
where pC is the unconditional probability that any observation is from a convenience user, which
is not directly observable. Since the mixing probabilities pC are unobserved, maximizing the
sum over all i and t of lnH requires also maximizing over the unobserved probability pc. Even
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if the underlying parameters of the revolver and convenience user models are easy to estimate,
this problem is very difficult to maximize jointly. Instead, the standard approach is to use the
Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm which alternates between estimating the parameters
for revolvers and convenience users conditional on pC , and pC conditional on the parameters.
The algorithm works as follows: We start round j of the algorithm with an estimate of the
probability that each observation is a convenience user: wj,Ci,t , where p
j,C is the average over all
i and t of wj,Ci,t . We take the initial w
0,C
i,t from the predictions of a logit model of convenience
use in the MEM survey based on credit utilization and age.8 Then, estimation proceeds in two
steps: (1) with wj,Ci,t as weights, we use Weighted Least Squares to estimate each of the models for
convenience users and revolvers independently; and (2) we update the weights and pj+1,C using
Bayes’ rule based on the new estimates from each model. Thus, for each iteration j,
wj+1,Ci,t =
pj,CfC(Di,t|θj,C)
pj,CfC(Di,t|θj,C) + (1− pj,c)fR(Di,t|θj,R)
,
and pj+1,C is the average of the new posterior weights for each observation. The two steps alternate
until the overall likelihood converges.
For each underlying model described below, we model the densities of the residuals as normally
distributed and require the conditional likelihood for a convenience user to follow the same condi-
tional likelihood of a being a convenience user in the MEM survey based on age and utilization.
Then the density for a convenience user is:
fC(Di,t|Di,t1 , Xi,t; θC , σC) = pCMEM(ageit, νit)φ(Di,t|Di,t, Xit; θC , σC),
where φ(·) denotes the density of the normal distribution with mean determined by the particu-
lar convenience model and variance (σC)2. Revolvers follow the same structure. We estimate
pCMEM(ageit, νit) using a logit model with a cubic for age and utilization. Figures 7 and 8 show
8We have also taken the initial probabilities as uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 and found that the initial
value does not affect convergence of the estimation.
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the estimated fractions of revolving (which implies the complementary fractions of convenience
use) over age (Panel A) and utilization (Panel B) using the MEM surveyestimates of pCMEM , and
compares them with the corresponding estimates from the MEM survey and SCF logit models.
5.2 Estimated models of credit use
This section reports the results of estimating several possible models of credit use with the EM
algorithm. Table 3 shows five joint models of revolving and convenience use. For each model,
we calculate the average probability across all consumer quarters of revolving. For comparison,
the mean self-reported revolving status across consumers with credit cards in the MEM survey is
51 percent. We also calculate the mean squared difference between the probability of revolving
predicted by the model for consumers in the MEM survey during the quarter of the survey and
their self-reported revolving status. We calculate the full model for the entire CCP sample, but can
only compare the self-reported status to the MEM respondents.
Even within a user type, consumers may have very different preferences, so all of the models
allow individual specific effects. In practice, due to the size of the data set and the iterative nature
of the algorithm, we removed the individual and time effects first by regressing each variable on
individual and year fixed effects and then using the residuals to estimate the credit-use models. All
models include a cubic polynomial in age.
The five model specifications provide a range of diverse options to discern which approach to
handling stationarity and dynamics best fits the data. The key differences among the specifications
are:
• Model 1 takes logs of credit card debt and limit following equation (7) for revolvers and
equation (4) for convenience users.9 As shown in Figure 5, credit card limits and debt have
very large values and very small values. Taking logs makes the assumption of normal resid-
ual variance more reasonable.
9To avoid discarding consumers with zero debt, the actual transformation is to add to each consumer with a credit
card $100 in credit card debt and limit.
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• Models 2 and 3 do not transform debt and credit limits. Model 2 allows convenience use
to follow a random walk with drift following equation (4), while in model 3 convenience
use varies around an individual specific mean following equation (3). Both models follow
equation (6) for revolvers.
• Models 4 and 5 instead divide debt by the credit limit to allow the dynamics of credit utiliza-
tion (νit = Dit/Bit) to vary across model type. Normalizing by the credit limit is a different
way to make the decisions of consumers with very high and very low limits comparable but
imposes restrictions on the impact of past debt and credit. Both models take revolvers as
following a simple AR(1) process. For convenience users, Model 4 takes utilization as fol-
lowing a martingale while model 5 takes utilization as varying around an individual specific
mean.
It turns out that the models make very different predictions and some perform quite poorly.
Model 1 produces an average revolving status that is closest to the results of surveys. Model 2
under-predicts revolving while model 3 substantially over-predicts revolving. Both models 2 and
3 depart substantially from the MEM consumers self-reported revolving status as judged by the
mean squared difference. With a common residual variance across consumers but large differences
in credit limits and debt across consumers (see Figure 5), the models using untransformed dollar
values do not appear helpful in distinguishing consumer uses.
In contrast, models 4 and 5 with credit utilization perform fairly well. Model 4 somewhat
underpredicts revolving while model 5 somewhat overpredicts revolving. Models 1 and 5 have the
best match to MEM self-reported revolving. Model 4 has a slightly better match than model 1, but
over-predicts revolving overall.
To better understand how these models differ in their predictions, Figure 7 for model 1 and
Figure 8 for model 5 show how these models compare across several dimensions. Panel A of
Figures 7 and 8 shows the fraction of revolvers at different ages that come from the EM estimates
(using the posterior weights for each observation) compared to a logit from the MEM survey (see
also Figure 3) and a similar logit from the SCF. Panel B of both figures shows similar results over
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credit utilization. Both models match the distribution of revolving across utilization fairly well.
Model 1 matches the MEM survey distribution of revolving across age much better than model 5.
The similarity suggests that differences in dynamics among consumers in the CCP do not produce
large differences across utilization.
The advantage of the Finite Mixture Model over simply using a prediction from a survey is
that it takes into account individual dynamics. It can therefore make individual predictions that are
distinct from what a logit fit from a survey would imply. Panel C of Figures 7 and 8 shows the
density of the revolving prediction for people who respond that they are a revolver in the MEM
surveyand not a revolver. The dashed line shows the density of the probability that some is a
revolver based on a logit of age and utilization. Unsurprisingly, people who report being revolvers
have a large density at a high probability of revolving and people who report not revolving have a
high density at a low predicted probability of revolving. Note, however, that the logit also predicts
some people who report not revolving have some probability of actually being a revolver based
on their utilization. For example, a middle age person with 80 percent utilization may report not
revolving, but the logit suggests based on other similar people, that this person is likely to revolve.
The Finite Mixture Model estimates help differentiate people by putting more weight on pre-
dictions that someone either is or is not a revolver with high probability in Panel C. Adding the
dynamics thus helps provide more separation. Panel C thus suggests that the Finite Mixture Model
using debt dynamics has more predictive power than just using age and utilization alone.
Panel C in Figures 7 and 8 provides some insight into why model 5 has a better mean squared
difference from MEM, despite substantially over-predicting revolving. If the algorithm perfectly
predicted survey responses, all of the density in Panel C would be at zero for survey not-revolvers
and at one for survey revolvers. The estimates in both models put more weight closer to zero
and one than the logit and more weight contradicting the survey responses. Model 1 contradicts
MEM respondents somewhat more than model 5, putting somewhat higher density in predicting
that self-reported non-revolvers are revolving and the reverse.
While both model 1 and model 5 provide a reasonable fit, we take model 1 as our base model
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for examining how revolvers and convenience users differ. Model 5 does not produce qualitatively
different estimates, but its over-prediction of revolving suggests it is less accurate.
6 How are revolvers and convenience users different?
This section uses the Finite Mixture Model predictions in the previous section with model 1 as a
baseline to examine differences between revolvers and convenience users. We start by comparing
average utilization and examine what the estimates say about transitions from revolver to conve-
nience user. Then, using the revolving probabilities as weights, we examine how individual debt
and credit dynamics differ. We expect that our methodology has additional applications, but these
areas are continuing questions in understanding credit card use.
6.1 Average utilization
Panel D in Figures 7 and 8 show the average utilization of revolvers and convenience users by
age for models 1 and 5 using the converged weights to estimate utilization as a local polynomial
function of age. In both models, conditional on still being a revolver, average utilization declines
slowly from around 60 percent in the 20s to 50 percent in the 60s and then more quickly after that.
The average utilization of convenience users also declines slowly. An important factor explaining
the overall decline in utilization is the decline in the fraction of revolvers, as the population slowly
shifts from the top line of revolvers to the bottom line of convenience users.
6.2 Revolving transitions
A recurring question in understanding consumer credit is how long people spend borrowing. If
a sizable portion of the population uses credit to smooth over shocks, then borrowing should be
transitory. However, some consumers may be revolving for long periods due to preferences such
as impatience or present bias, a “debt spiral,” or other explanations not found in the benchmark
life-cycle model. Because few surveys have a panel dimension and credit bureau data cannot
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distinguish between revolving and convenience use, it has been difficult to understand revolving
persistence. Grodzicki and Koulayev (2019) examine revolving episodes in a data set that includes
only single credit card lines that are not linked across consumers. Even considering single lines,
the average revolving episode is quite long.
The EM algorithm produces a posterior weight of revolving for each consumer-quarter. This
weight is the Bayes rule update of the likelihood that the consumer-quarter observation comes from
the revolver model or the convenience user model. These weights can change for a consumer over
time as utilization or the debt and limit dynamics change. For example, if a consumer’s utilization
drops significantly, the algorithm would suggest that the likelihood of revolving is lower.
Treating these model-based likelihoods as probabilities of revolving, we examine how con-
sumers transition from a high revolving probability (revolving probability above 75 percent),
medium probability revolvers (25 percent to 75 percent), to low revolving probability (less than
or equal to 25 percent). Table 2 shows that in any given quarter, 45 percent of accounts are high
probability revolvers, 25 are medium probability, and 30 percent low probability revolvers. Taking
the average revolving probability over all the quarters we observe a given consumer, 27 percent of
consumers have an average probability of revolving greater than 75 percent over all quarters we
observe them, 66 have a medium probability on average, and 6 percent have a low probability on
average.
High probability revolving status is very persistent. Table 2 shows the transition matrix from
high, medium, and low revolving probability. Conditional on being a high probability revolver,
71 percent are still high probability revolvers in one year, 67 percent in two years, and 63 percent
in four years. Almost all of the transition is into medium probability status, rather than to a low
probability of revolving; 20 percent of high probability revolvers have become low probability
revolvers after four years. Conversely, a low probability revolver today is a low probability revolver
45 percent of the time in one year, 42 percent in two years and 40 percent in four years. Thirty
percent of low probability revolvers have transitioned into high probability revolvers after four
years.
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These probability transitions compare well to the limited survey evidence on overall revolving
transitions. The SCPC had a repeat sample over several years. Using consumers who appear in
more than sample, we calculate that 82.7 percent of self-reported revolvers in one year are also
revolvers in the next year. Similarly, 87.5 percent of convenience users report being a convenience
user in the next year.
Put together, our estimates suggest that somewhat more than half the population is a high prob-
ability revolver at a given time and this population generally stays a high probability revolver for
a long time. A somewhat smaller proportion of the population is consistently a high probability
convenience user. The medium probability revolvers do not generally stay medium probability
revolvers: after four years 28 percent are high probability revolvers and 35 percent are low prob-
ability revolvers. In reality, these medium probability consumers are either revolving or not. The
intermediate probability reflects that their debt dynamics, utilization, and age do not place a high
posterior weight on either model.
6.3 Debt dynamics
This section examines how debt changes for an individual and how these changes are related to
changes in credit and debt in the past. The basic specification is a variant of model 1,
lnDit = θi + θt + f(ageit) + α lnDit−1 + β lnBi,t−1 + εit, (10)
with individual-specific levels of log credit card debt (θi) and common time shocks (θt) in addition
to the age polynomial (f(ageit)). The coefficient β on the lagged credit limit determines how
quickly a shock to credit card debt (εit) dissipates back to the individual long-term effect given by
θi + θt + f(ageit) + β lnBit. The effect of a change in credit limits is β within one quarter, and
β/(1 − α) in the long term. In more advanced specifications we allow α and β to change with
age and with credit utilization so that, for example, older people or those close to using all of their
available credit may react differently to a change in the limit.
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In most specifications, we include those with zero debt by giving everyone $100 in both credit
and debt so that, rather than being undefined, these individuals are included as having nearly zero
debt (we still exclude individuals with zero credit). The functional form in equation (10) with logs
excludes consumers who have zero debt in the current or previous period because the log of zero is
undefined. Equation (10) therefore estimates the response of those with debt to changes in limits
conditional on having debt and a positive credit limit.
Table 3 shows the results of estimating several variations of equation (10). Column 1 shows the
base specification, column 2 gives everyone $100 in credit and debt and so includes those with no
current debt. At the bottom of the table we calculate the long-term impact of a permanent increase
in credit β/(1− α). Columns 3 and 4 weight by revolving probability, while column 5 weights by
convenience probability. Table 4 shows similar estimates without taking logs for robustness.
On average across all consumers and adjusting for age, the pass-through of credit into debt
occurs rapidly—nearly 75 percent in the long term in Table 3. Pass-through is somewhat larger in
column 2 including card holders with zero debt, and in column 1 of Table 4 without taking logs.
These results for all consumers mask important differences between revolvers and convenience
users. For revolvers, nearly 100 percent of a change in credit becomes debt eventually. Column
4 of Table 3 shows the estimated effects of debt and credit changes for revolvers. Debt returns to
its steady state more slowly than when estimated over all credit users, as one would expect. The
immediate impact of credit is lower, but the long-term impact of a change in credit for revolvers is
nearly 100 percent due to the persistence of debt. In fact, in column 4 the long-term pass-through
is 99.3 percent. In contrast, the pass-through is much lower for convenience users in column 5.
This finding is the same when not taking logs in Table 4— the pass-through is 99.2 percent in the
long term for revolvers (column 2), but much lower for convenience users.
The last row in Tables 3 and 4 calculates the salience of credit limit changes. The calculation
assumes that any departures from this relationship are due to credit limits being less binding or
salient than debt and calculates how much less important credit limits are using equations (9) and
(8).
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This salience calculation matters empirically for several reasons. First, it is an approximation
of the extent to which credit limits bind; if a change in credit limits has zero salience, credit limits
are not effectively binding behavior. Second, in an intertemporal budget calculation, the credit
limit is a binding constraint that enters much the same way debt does so changes in credit look
much like changes in debt in terms of their effect on the budget constraint. Yet credit is variable
(Fulford, 2015a) and many people may not know their limits. Others may think of limits as “soft”
constraints that can be increased simply by contacting the bank. Still others just may not care much
about their limits. The salience calculation combines all of these reasons into a single number that
asks: relative to the effect of debt, how much less impact does the credit limit have?
For revolvers, who might actually hit their limit, credit is half as salient as debt (columns 3 and
4 of Table 3 and column 2 of Table 4) using an interest rate of 14.07 percent.10 Once again, this
result varies significantly between revolvers and convenience users. For convenience users, credit
is only approximately 6 percent as salient as debt (column 5 in Table 3 and column 3 of Table
4). This division suggests that, in general, changes in credit have by far their largest impact on
revolvers. Fulford and Schuh (2017) make a similar observation through estimating a structural
model of revolving.
We can also allow the response of debt to past debt and current limits to vary flexibly with credit
utilization and age.11 Because the coefficients from such a regression are difficult to interpret on
their own, Figure 9 shows the marginal effects for revolvers evaluated over ages 20 to 70 and
utilization from 0.1 to 1. We restrict this examination to revolvers using the posterior weights from
model 1.
10The average Federal Reserve G-19 series for commercial bank interest rate on credit card plans, accounts assessed
interest; not seasonally adjusted from May 2004 through May 2019 on an annual basis. We use the implied monthly
(compounded) rate in the calculation.
11We estimate the following functional form for α and an identical one for β:











it + α8υit−1 ∗ ageit + α9υ2it−1 ∗ ageit + α10υit−1 ∗ age2it + α11υ2it−1 ∗ age2it,
where υ(0)it is 1 if utilization is 0, and 0 otherwise, υ
(1)
it is 1 if utilization is greater than 1.1 and 0 otherwise, and
υ2it = υit ∗ υit. Note that, like the credit limit, the credit utilization rate is measured as the credit limit at the end of the
period divided by the debt at the beginning.
25
Several important changes with age and credit utilization for revolvers are clear from Figure 9.
First, the marginal effect of the credit limit is fairly similar to the average effect in Table 3 except at
the lowest utilization rates. Second, the sum of the estimated credit effect and estimated debt effect
is nearly constant and close to one at any age or utilization rate, which implies a relatively constant
and high salience of credit for revolvers at all ages. Third, the long-term effect of credit on debt is
large and relatively constant across ages and utilization rates. Panel (C) calculates the long-term
effect at each age and utilization (essentially dividing the marginal effect at each age in panel (A)
by one minus the marginal effect of debt in panel (B)). Young people reach that long-term state
faster, but for all revolvers the long-term effect of credit on debt is nearly 100 percent. Fourth, the
effect of utilization is extremely nonlinear at any age. The effects of credit and past debt are nearly
identical for those using between 0.1 and 0.7 of their credit, but then change rapidly as individuals
get closer to using all of their credit. Apparently, credit utilization matters a lot only when the the
consumer is close to her credit limit. Finally, age and credit utilization do not seem to interact.
Excluding the age-credit utilization interactions would not change this picture appreciably because
the different lines connecting credit utilization are nearly parallel for different ages.
6.4 Credit dynamics
We next examine whether there is an important feedback mechanism from debt to credit. Table 5
shows the impact of past credit and debt on current credit. Allowing for individual specific means
in credit, deviations from the long term are fairly persistent, with 91 percent of a deviation still
existing within a quarter. Debt has a small negative impact on credit in column 1 and a small
positive impact in column 2 which includes those with zero debt. Over the long term, averaging
over all consumers, a permanent 1 percent increase in debt results in a 5 percent fall in credit in
column 1 or a 3 percent increase in credit in the long term. This small positive effect is explained
by substantial heterogeneity by type of consumer as shown in columns 3 and 4. An increase in




This section examines how credit utilization changes from quarter to quarter parametrically for
different types of users. In previous work (Fulford and Schuh, 2015), we showed that moving to
a parametric specification does not seem to matter on average because the conditional expectation
functions are surprisingly linear. Table 6 shows how utilization this period is related to utilization
in the previous period using regressions of the form:
υit = θt + θa + θi + βυit−1 + εit, (11)
where υit = Dit/Bit is credit utilization conditional on Bit > 0, age (θa) and quarter (θt).12 All
regressions use de-meaned data for included variables to absorb fixed effects rather than estimating
them separately due to sample size.
The first column shows the population average effect. On average, a deviation from the indi-
vidual mean diminishes at a rate of about 0.29=1-0.71 per quarter. And so, after a 10 percentage
point increase in utilization 7 percentage points remain in one quarter, 2.5 percentage points in a
year, and 0.64 percentage points after two years. The estimates in Table 6 emphasize that credit
utilization for an individual is very stable. While there are deviations from the long-term mean,
these dissipate quickly and are largely gone within two years.
The next two columns show analogous estimates for revolvers and convenience users. For
revolvers, changes in utilization are somewhat more persistent. Convenience users, on the other
hand, have almost no persistence in shocks to utilization.
7 Conclusion
Many consumer finance and counter-cyclical policy questions depend on how consumers respond
to changes in credit or the price of debt. Yet credit bureau data that does not measure revolv-
12The combined age, quarter, and individual fixed effects are not identified. We drop one of each and use the
normalization on the age effects discussed in section 6.4.
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ing directly. Credit cards’ mixed use as a payment instrument and a revolving debt mechanism
confounds different populations and responses, making understanding mechanisms and the likely
effect of policy difficult. By developing a method to separate revolvers and convenience users in
the main, comprehensive source of information about debt and credit, we allow a deeper under-
standing of many of these questions.
Our methodology sheds light on some important questions about how revolvers and conve-
nience users differ. Available credit appears to be the driving factor of debt for revolvers in both
the short and long term. Separating convenience users from revolvers, we find that for revolvers
an increase in credit is followed by a nearly 100 percent increase in debt over the long term. For
those revolving debt, long-term credit and debt are closely related; we calculate that for revolvers
changes in credit limits are half as impactful as changes in debt. In addition, those revolving are
typically revolving for long periods of time.
Our analysis infers whether the consumer is revolving based on his or her utilization and debt
dynamics for all cards combined, but the CFPB CCP contains information on each credit card held
by an individual consumer. One interesting area for future research is to explore how consumers
manage their card portfolio across multiple cards. For example, do consumers who are revolving
maintain most or all of their balance on a single card? How do the number of cards of revolving
and convenience users compare? How does utilization overall compare to utilization for each card
and is this different for revolvers and convenience users.
Future research on the use of credit cards would be enhanced by improving and expanding the
credit bureau data. Direct measurement of revolving versus convenience use is the most obvious
data refinement that could shine a light on credit card use. Including comprehensive details on
consumer management of their credit card debt by measuring monthly payments would enable
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A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of debt revolver accumulation equation
From equation (2) we have:
Di,t+1
1 + r
−Di,t + Yi,t = Ci,t(Yi,t +Bi,t −Di,t).
Let Yit = Pi,tUi,t, where Pi,t = Et−1[Yi,t] is the long-term or permanent component of income
given age t, and B∗i,t is the expected credit limit at age t for a given individual. Then define D
∗
i,t as
the debt at which, given a credit limit B∗i,t and income realization Yi,t = Pi,t, consumption is equal
to income minus interest payments and so debt is not increasing or decreasing:
−rD∗i,t
1 + r
+ Pi,t = Ct(Pi,t +B
∗
i,t −D∗i,t).
Note that this is the Permanent Income Hypothesis consumption function in which all of permanent
income and the annuity value of current wealth is consumed (Hall, 1978). A first-order expansion
of Ct(·) around the point focal point W ∗i,t = D∗i,t −B∗i,t − Pi,t then gives:
Di,t+1 ≈ (1 + r)Mi,tBi,t + (1 + r)(1−Mi,t)Di,t +Mi,tYi,t + [Constant],




i,t) is the marginal propensity to consume out of liquid cash-at-hand at its
steady state. If Mi,tYi,t and the constant can be well captured by individual fixed effects, age
effects, and year effects, then a regression of the form:
Di,t+1 = µi + µt + g(agei,t) + αDi,t + βBi,t + εi,t,
where M is the average of the Mi,t, α = (1 + r)(1 −M), β = (1 + r)M , and εi,t captures the
approximation error that represents unobserved income shocks not explained by age, individual,
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time, and differences from the average α and β. Note that Mi,t may vary with age or overall credit
utilization as well.
The assumptions necessary for the linear expansion in levels to provide a good approximation
are strong, particularly comparing across many individuals with very different incomes and debt. A
more flexible expansion involves taking logs and expanding around D∗i,t, B
∗
i,t, and Pi,t. Canceling
constants and using the steady-state equation gives a first-order approximation:
D∗i,t
(1 + r)
di,t+1 −D∗i,tdi,t + Pit lnUi,t ' mit(Pi,t lnUi,t +B∗i,tbi,t −D∗i,tdi,t),




i,t) is the elasticity of consumption
with respect to cash-at-hand at the steady-state cash-at-hand W ∗i,t. Rearranging gives:
di,t+1 ' (1 + r)(1−mi,t)di,t + (1 + r)mi,t
B∗i,t
D∗i,t




Defining m = E[mi,t] and ν̄ = E[
D∗i,t
B∗i,t
] as average credit utilization, then:




where εsit captures contains the idiosyncratic portion of the coefficients and the unpredictable in-
come component. Following Blundell et al. (2008), suppose that idiosyncratic and age-specific
drift factors are well-captured by an individual effect and age effects (or functions) so the approx-
imation error is εsi,t = µi + µt + g(agei,t) + εi,t,. Then
di,t+1 = µi + µt + g(agei,t) + αdi,t + βbi,t + εi,t,
where α = (1 + r)(1−m), β = (1 + r)m/ν̄ and E[εit] = 0.
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1970m1 1980m1 1990m1 2000m1 2010m1 2020m1
Date
Debt on revolving accounts/Personal income (left, percent)
Debt on revolving accounts (right, billions $)
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED; Board of Governors G.19 Consumer Credit "Total Revolving Credit
Owned and Securitized, Outstanding"; and Bureau of Economic Analysis Disposable Personal Income.










20- 25- 30- 35- 40- 45- 50- 55- 60- 65- 70- 75-
Age group
Credit card adopter Credit card user
Share of payments using a credit card (if adopter)
Source: Authors’ calculations from the pooled 2012-2017 Survey of Consumer Payment Choice.
36
















20- 25- 30- 35- 40- 45- 50- 55- 60- 65- 70- 75-
Age group
Making Ends Meet Survey of Consumer Payment Choice
Notes: Each dot represents the age-group mean from that survey (the surveys are offset so they can be cleanly distin-
guished). Bars are 95-percent confidence intervals. Source: Authors’ calculations from the MEM survey and SCPC.















0- 1- 10- 20- 30- 40- 50- 60- 70- 80- 90- 100- 110-
Credit card utilization percentage group
Notes: Each dot represents the mean for that utilization group from the MEM survey. Utilization is calculated using
the CCP linked to that respondent. Bars are 95-percent confidence intervals. Source: Authors’ calculations from the
MEM survey.
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Figure 5: Distributions of credit card limits, debt, and credit utilization by age
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20 40 60 80
Age
Notes: Each line is a percentile of the distribution of credit limits, debt, or utilization at that age, conditional on
having a positive credit limit or debt on a log scale. For example, the 90th-percentile line shows that 10 percent of
the population (with a positive credit limit) have a limit larger than that line. The 99th-percentile credit utilization is
above 1.5. Source: Authors’ calculations from the CCP.
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0 50 100 150
Credit card utilization (percent)
Notes: Shows the distribution of credit utilization (credit card debt/credit card limit if the the limit is positive). The
histogram excludes utilization rates greater than 150 percent. Source: Authors’ calculations from the CCP.
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Figure 7: Revolving status from EM estimates of Model 1 (log transformation)
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Notes: Sources: Authors’ calculations from CCP based on the finite mixture model, and the MEM and SCF.
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Figure 8: Revolving status from EM estimates of Model 5 (utilization)
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Notes: Sources: Authors’ calculations from CCP based on the finite mixture model, and the MEM and SCF.
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Figure 9: Average marginal effects of credit and previous debt on debt for revolvers
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20 30 40 50 60 70
Age
Utilitzation 0.1 0.4 0.7
 0.8 0.9 1
Notes: For panel (C) each point is calculated using the marginal effect in (A) divided by one minus the marginal effect
in (B). Source: Authors’ calculations from CCP based on a finite mixture model separating convenience users from
revolvers.
42




1 Revolver lnDi,t = γRXi,t + α lnDi,t−1 + β lnBi,t + εRi,t 56.6% 0.278
Convenience ∆ lnDi,t = γCXi,t + εCi,t
2 Revolver Di,t = γRXi,t + αDi,t−1 + βBi,t + εRi,t 31.3% 0.395
Convenience ∆Di,t = γCXi,t + f(ageit) + εCi,t
3 Revolver Di,t = γRXi,t + αDi,t−1 + βBi,t + εRi,t 86.6% 0.439
Convenience Di,t = γCXi,t + εCi,t
4 Revolver νi,t = γRXi,t + βνi,t−1 + εRi,t 45.4% 0.323
Convenience ∆νi,t = γCXi,t + +εCi,t
5 Revolver νi,t = γRXi,t + βνi,t−1 + εRi,t 64.1% 0.246
Convenience νi,t = γCXi,t + εCi,t
Notes: Each model includes individual effects, time effects, and an age polynomial in Xi,t and νit is credit utilization
(Dit/Bit). “Quarters revolving” is the average over all consumer-quarters of the predicted probability of revolving.
“Mean squared difference from MEM” is the mean of the squared difference between an indicator that is one if a
consumer reports revolving in MEM surveyand the predicted probability of revolving. Source: Authors’ calculations
from CCP and the MEM survey.
Table 2: Transitions from probabilities consumer is revolving
Probability Probability
revolver Unconditional revolver
today: distribution after: One year Two years Four years
High 44.62 High 71.18 67.42 63.31
Medium 11.6 13.96 16.34
Low 17.22 18.62 20.34
Medium 25.35 High 20.39 23.87 27.69
Medium 44.97 40.89 36.92
Low 34.64 35.24 35.39
Low 30.04 High 25.79 28.11 30.33
Medium 29.52 29.46 29.36
Low 44.69 42.43 40.31
Notes: High probability revolvers have a predicted probability of revolving greater than 75 percent, Medium proba-
bility is between 25 and 75 percent, and Low probability is 25 percent or less. Source: Authors’ calculations from
CCP.
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Table 3: Regression results for Log Debt dynamics
Dependent variable: Log Debtt
All All Revolvers Revolvers Convenience
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Log Debtt−1 0.564*** 0.672*** 0.911*** 0.952*** 0.395***
(0.000298) (0.000251) (0.000116) (8.50e-05) (0.000315)
Log Credit Limitt−1 0.244*** 0.165*** 0.0628*** 0.0416*** 0.248***
(0.000456) (0.000344) (0.000146) (0.000112) (0.000498)
Observations 8,024,570 9,329,180 7,332,216 8,292,323 9,191,895
R-squared 0.442 0.561 0.934 0.962 0.250
Demeaned Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zero included (add $100 to log) Yes Yes Yes
Age polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Long-term credit impact 0.746 0.805 0.972 0.993 0.525
Average utilization 0.344 0.304 0.466 0.425 0.146
Credit salience σ 0.188 0.148 0.293 0.299 0.059
Notes: Only includes observations with an open credit card. Columns with “Zero included=Yes” include observations
with zero debt; in these regressions, all debt and credit limits are transformed by adding $100 before taking logs. Credit
salience is σ = ν̄β/(1 + r − α) where α is coefficient on debt, β on the credit limit, ν̄ is average credit utilization,
and r = (1 + 14.02/100)1/12. Source: Authors’ calculations from CCP.




Debtt−1 0.827*** 0.974*** 0.497***
(0.000207) (9.42e-05) (0.000297)
Credit Limitt−1 0.0272*** 0.0182*** 0.0340***
(0.000114) (5.70e-05) (0.000137)
Observations 9,329,180 8,292,323 9,191,895
R-squared 0.734 0.959 0.314
Demeaned Yes Yes Yes
Age polynomial Yes Yes Yes
Long-term credit impact 0.850 0.992 0.514
Credit salience σ 0.148 0.491 0.066
Notes: Credit salience is σ = β/(1 + r − α) where α is coefficient on debt, β on the credit limit, and r = (1 +
14.02/100)1/12. Source: Authors’ calculations from CCP.
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Table 5: Regression results for Log Limit dynamics
Dependent variable: Log Limitt
All All Convenience Revolvers
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Log Debtt−1 -0.00485*** 0.00297*** -0.0137*** 0.0330***
(0.000101) (0.000114) (0.000120) (9.81e-05)
Log Credit Limitt−1 0.908*** 0.900*** 0.821*** 0.916***
(0.000159) (0.000155) (0.000190) (0.000129)
Observations 8,263,449 9,329,180 9,191,895 8,292,323
R-squared 0.839 0.835 0.725 0.915
De-meaned Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zero included? Yes Yes
Age polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes
Long-term debt impact -0.053 0.030 -0.077 0.393
Notes: Only includes observations with an open credit card. Columns with “Zero included=Yes” include observations
with zero debt; in these regressions, all debt and credit limits are transformed by adding $100 before taking logs.
Source: Authors’ calculations from CCP.
Table 6: Regression results for Credit utilization dynamics
Dep. Variable: Credit utilizationi,t
All Revolver Convenience
Credit utilizationi,t−1 0.709*** 0.879*** 0.370***
(0.000235) (0.000185) (0.000287)
Observations 9,168,829 8,274,886 9,168,829
R-squared 0.498 0.732 0.154
Demeaned Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The sample includes observations when credit utilization is zero but excludes individual quarters when utiliza-
tion is undefined (limit is zero) or utilization is greater than 5 (a very small fraction, see figure 6). All columns include
age and year effects, with age effects normalized to have zero trend when fixed effects are included. Source: Authors’
calculations from CCP.
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